Atul Mantri | LIP6 - Équipe QI

Towards a Unified Quantum Protocol Framework: Classification, Implementation, and Use Cases

Sun, 24 Nov 2024 00:00:00 +0000

We present a framework for the unification and standardization of quantum network protocols, making their realization easier and expanding their use cases to a broader range of communities interested in quantum technologies. Our framework is available as an open-source repository, the Quantum Protocol Zoo. We follow a modular approach by identifying two key components: Functionality, which connects real-world applications; and Protocol, which is a set of instructions between two or many parties, at least one of which has a quantum device. Based on the different stages of the quantum internet and use-case in the commercialization of quantum communication, our framework classifies quantum cryptographic functionalities and the various protocol designs implementing these functionalities. Towards this classification, we introduce a novel concept of resource visualization for quantum protocols, which includes two interfaces: one to identify the building blocks for implementing a given protocol and another to identify accessible protocols when certain physical resources or functionalities are available. Such classification provides a hierarchy of quantum protocols based on their use-case and resource allocation. We have identified various valuable tools to improve its representation with a range of techniques, from abstract cryptography to graphical visualizations of the resource hierarchy in quantum networks. We elucidate the structure of the zoo and its primary features in this article to a broader class of quantum information scientists, physicists, computer science theorists and end-users. Since its introduction in 2018, the quantum protocol zoo has been a cornerstone in serving the quantum networks community in its ability to establish the use cases of emerging quantum internet networks. In that spirit we also provide some of the applications of our framework from different perspectives.

Towards a Unified Quantum Protocol Framework: Classification, Implementation, and Use Cases

Tue, 14 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000

Secure Quantum Two-Party Computation: Impossibility and Constructions

Tue, 05 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0000

Secure two-party computation considers the problem of two parties computing a joint function of their private inputs without revealing anything beyond the output of the computation. In this work, we take the first steps towards understanding the setting in which the two parties want to evaluate a joint quantum functionality while using only a classical channel between them. Our first result indicates that it is in general impossible to realize a two-party quantum functionality against malicious adversaries with black-box simulation, relying only on classical channels. The negative result stems from reducing the existence of a black-box simulator to an extractor for classical proof of quantum knowledge, which in turn leads to violation of the quantum no-cloning. Next, we introduce the notion of oblivious quantum function evaluation (OQFE). An OQFE is a two-party quantum cryptographic primitive with one fully classical party (Alice) whose input is (a classical description of a) quantum unitary, $U$, and a quantum party (Bob) whose input is a quantum state, $\psi$. In particular, Alice receives a classical output corresponding to the measurement of $U(\psi)$ while Bob receives no output. In OQFE, Bob remains oblivious to Alice’s input, while Alice learns nothing about $\psi$ more than what can be learned from the output. We present two constructions, one secure against semi-honest parties and the other against malicious parties. Due to the no-go result mentioned above, we consider what is arguably the best possible notion obtainable in our model concerning malicious adversaries: one-sided simulation security. Our protocol relies on the assumption of injective homomorphic trapdoor OWFs, which in turn rely on the LWE problem. As a result, we put forward a first, simple and modular, construction of one-sided quantum two-party computation and quantum oblivious transfer over classical networks.

Security Limitations of Classical-Client Delegated Quantum Computing

Mon, 07 Dec 2020 00:00:00 +0000

Secure delegated quantum computing allows a computationally weak client to outsource an arbitrary quantum computation to an untrusted quantum server in a privacy-preserving manner. One of the promising candidates to achieve classical delegation of quantum computation is classical-client remote state preparation ($RSP_{CC}$), where a client remotely prepares a quantum state using a classical channel. However, the privacy loss incurred by employing $RSP_{CC}$ as a sub-module is unclear. In this work, we investigate this question using the Constructive Cryptography framework by Maurer and Renner (ICS'11). We first identify the goal of $RSP_{CC}$ as the construction of ideal RSP resources from classical channels and then reveal the security limitations of using $RSP_{CC}$. First, we uncover a fundamental relationship between constructing ideal RSP resources (from classical channels) and the task of cloning quantum states. Any classically constructed ideal RSP resource must leak to the server the full classical description (possibly in an encoded form) of the generated quantum state, even if we target computational security only. As a consequence, we find that the realization of common RSP resources, without weakening their guarantees drastically, is impossible due to the no-cloning theorem. Second, the above result does not rule out that a specific $RSP_{CC}$ protocol can replace the quantum channel at least in some contexts, such as the Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC) protocol of Broadbent et al. (FOCS ‘09). However, we show that the resulting UBQC protocol cannot maintain its proven composable security as soon as $RSP_{CC}$ is used as a subroutine. Third, we show that replacing the quantum channel of the above UBQC protocol by the $RSP_{CC}$ protocol QFactory of Cojocaru et al. (Asiacrypt ‘19), preserves the weaker, game-based, security of UBQC.